Book Review: "Franklin and Winston - An Intimate Protrait of an Epic Friendship" by Jon Meacham

Franklin and Winston: A Portrait of a Friendship (2003)

4 Stars out of 5

Jon Meacham

490 pages

Having recently read Doris Kearns Goodwin’s fine book on Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt (“No Ordinary Time: Franklin and EleanorRoosevelt, The Home Front in WWII”, 1995) I was captivated with her description of the closeness in the relationship between the US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. It was thus with some enthusiasm that I sought out and read Jon Meacham’s book on that very subject, “Franklin and Winston: “A Portrait of a Friendship” (2003). This was Meacham’s first book as an author, though his second actual published book (the first was as an editor). It is a remarkably clear and concise book written with apparent conviction in the character of the two men being profiled. Two men that most definitely stand up to Meacham’s comment: “…it does matter who is in power at critical points.”

FDR’s first meeting with Winston did not bode at all well for their future relationship: Winston had no memory of it, while FDR did not like what he saw in Winston’s brusque manner. It was at a party held in London, 1918. At the time, Winston was the former 1^st Lord of the Admiralty, while FDR was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Even though they didn’t know it at the time, they had much in common: not just positions within each country’s navy, but as one might guess considering their occupations, great fascination in naval strategy and how it could be used in the defense of their countries; coupled with this was a similar thirst in both men for political power. They were also close to the same age (Winston was 43, FDR was 36), loved strong drink, tobacco, and both were filled to the brim with self-confidence and courage – twenty years later they would have ample opportunity to display these characteristics.

They renewed their stalled relationship in the autumn of 1939 when FDR wrote Winston to congratulate him on his re-appointment to the Admiralty. Winston had re-joined the Navy under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. This PM with his doomed strategy of trying to negotiate a lasting peace with Adolph Hitler did not care for Winston Churchill.  The problem Chamberlain had with Churchill was Churchill’s public enthusiasm for using the military to solve international disputes. Nevertheless, Chamberlain was clear-headed enough to see by September of that year that the English people needed a warrior, not a negotiator. Winston would shortly thereafter become PM and replace Chamberlain in May 1940.  Early in this period as PM, as the situation in Europe deteriorated further with the Nazis taking one country after another, Winston would devise a simple maxim: the only sure path to victory required getting the Americans into the war. He decided the needed tactic was to “woo” the American people with him and England as the suitor, and the Americans and FDR as the reluctant maiden.

Winston’s decision and actions taken in the “wooing” of FDR seemed in the context of Meacham’s book to often set Winston into a position of inferiority in the relationship between the two men. In some circumstances their relationship was as between two close families: they would spend 131 days together between 1939 and FDR’s death in the spring of 1945; but like families everywhere, they would have some very bad times as well. Their meetings together in the US would be amongst their closest as they spent various Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays celebrating simply (almost simply) as two close friends. I note it was “almost simply” as these gatherings were never just about the holidays: they were always meeting to formulate the needed plans to defeat Hitler.

Winston brought to these discussions a personal major lesson from history: the English defeat at Gallipoli in WWI. He had had a big role in the planning of that disastrous affair for the British and to a great degree it played in the back of his mind each time FDR, (Soviet Premier) Stalin and Winston discussed the long delayed invasion of France by the Allies. Stalin was fighting a brutal war with Hitler and pressed constantly for his two capitalist comrades to invade France in order to force Hitler to transfer some of his eastern troops to the western front and thus reduce the pressure on the Red Army. Winston fearing a repeat of the debacle at Gallipoli never seemed convinced that the Allies were truly ready to storm the beaches of France; he pushed first for a North African and then an Italian campaign. Despite the sympathetic manner in which Meacham presents these discussions, it frankly seems as if Winston was stalling; it certainly seemed so to Stalin. FDR in the meanwhile backed Winston on each of the two campaigns that came before Normandy, but his position in backing Winston never seemed fully whole hearted to Winston. Meacham on the other hand notes that it almost certainly was the right decision to delay the invasion to help up Allied forces in terms of materiel and troop experience. That being said, it still seemed as if the special two-way relationship between FDR and Winston was breaking down to some extent. It most definitely never became a solid three-way relationship with Stalin as an equal emotional partner. The special nature of the two-way bond changed in order to let Stalin into the relationship, and this fundamental change was overtly bothersome to Winston; meanwhile, FDR seemed oblivious to these effects.

This situation started to seriously deteriorate during the conference in Tehran in 1943 and then worsen still more in Yalta in late early 1945. The Tehran conference is especially instructive. During this meeting, FDR decided he wanted a one on one with Stalin. His reasons are far from clear, but Meacham notes that like Winston he may have felt he could gain control of any situation if he could only form a relationship with the person with whom he was negotiating; and it would appear that Winston’s strong personality and similar desire to control the conversation was disruptive to FDR’s technique. In any event, FDR’s attempts to speak to Stalin alone while not completely hidden from Winston were still done without Winston’s full consent. It left Winston deeply hurt. This situation was badly exacerbated during at least one dinner conversation where FDR was bantering with Stalin and doing so at Winston’s expense. It worked (for FDR) to the extent that Stalin ultimately would erupt in laughter, but failed to some degree as Winston would leave the table deeply chagrined; likely feeling betrayed. The irony of this whole episode is that the take-away from these exchanges between the three was that both Winston and FDR felt they understood and could control Stalin – Eastern European history has shown that nothing could have been further from the truth.

Late in 1943, their relationship would recover from the emotional depths of Tehran as both the Churchill and Roosevelt clans would meet again without Stalin, this time in Quebec during the holidays. During these festivities new highs and lows would occur. Their relationship would regain its feet and both would feel that this period was one of the happiest of their lives. The lows (for Winston at least) would occur when he tried once again to delay the pending May invasion at Normandy (it was ultimately deferred to 5Jun, and then again to 6Jun due to weather). Winston would fail in his quixotic quest, and would again in July when he would try to divert some of the forces in France to another fight the British were waging in the Mediterranean. Winston was endlessly convinced of the wrongness in FDR’s comment that the “shortest route to Berlin was a straight line” (from Normandy); it seems almost like a monomania. He just never truly gave up on the idea of not going through France.

Poor Winston was to have one more rough meeting with Stalin and FDR; this one in Yalta in early 1945. The meeting could not have had more importance: the shape of the new world order following WWII. In Yalta as in Tehran, FDR would seek out private meetings with Stalin. The difference this time is that there may have been more to his reasons than a tactical sense he could out-maneuver Stalin better singly than with Winston present. This time there was publically stated evidence from multiple occasions of FDR’s growing impatience with Winston’s verbosity. FDR would in the presence of his own staff (and at least one occasion with a lieutenant from Winston’s staff) make cutting remarks about Winston’s long speeches and his continued opposition to the Normandy invasion plan. While these comments were generally about how wordy Winston could get, there was also evidence of a divide between the two men that was defined by how each viewed Stalin. It is certain that both saw the threat (Winston perhaps more clearly than FDR), but being the type of man that each of them were, they possibly also felt they each saw it the more clearly. However, Meacham adds a second idea: that due to his rapidly failing health, FDR was no longer physically the man that he once was; and with this thought, came an increasing personal sense that he had to win every argument to prove that he was still on top of his game. Whatever the reason, the once robust friendship between the two men was suffering as the war drew to a close.

In the two examples of the Tehran and Yalta conferences, Meacham amply demonstrates his strength as a writer of historical narratives. Via his research coupled with his astute analysis of FDR and Winston’s decisions and their consequences, the reader gets a very clear idea of not just what took place but also gets a fairly good sense of the thoughts and passions that ran through the primary actors in these stories. For example, Meacham’s descriptions of the emotional Winston (“perfectly content to cry in public”) and the publically cold FDR (Truman: “the coldest man I ever met”) leads the reader to wonder at how with these personality differences they could become allies, let alone such close friends. Meacham notes that Winston as the son of an Englishman and an American woman may have brought something unique to the situation in terms of personal history; that he clearly had an emotional tie to the American people that was tighter than most English politicians; and being the strategist that he was, he could see the distinct advantage in cultivating a close relationship to FDR as the leader of the American people. But for me, it still begs the question, was there something else that brought these two men so close? Had WWII not intervened, would they have become friends at all? It is to me a little frustrating that Meacham does not really ask this question, or the follow-up question: do great men arise in time of need, or do the events shape men into great men?

The origin of Great Men/Great Leaders is a subject really worth discussing further and one I think about a lot. Examples of such men can readily be found by reading about certain American presidents (Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, and FDR in particular).  While it is certainly true that learning about such Great Men of American history in the context of their individual times of war may leave one awed at what each of these men did in terms of preparing our country for war and in prosecuting the war, it always for me leads to the real question: where do such men come from? And in the case of Winston and FDR, did their close (and productive) friendship also arise as a result from the same forces (i.e. the demands of WWII)? These may well be a kind of question that does not have a solid, generally true answer. In the case of FDR and Winston Churchill though, there can be no question of their individual greatness, the value of their partnership during WWII, and the world’s considerable benefit derived from that relationship.

“Franklin and Winston: A Portrait of a Friendship” is an excellent companion piece to the aforementioned Goodwin book on the Roosevelts during WWII. While she does an excellent job of digging deep into how people’s personalities can play critical roles in world events, Meacham’s book and style brings needed content and analysis. Meacham’s utilization of heretofore un-accessed letters from Pamela Churchill Randolph (married to Winston’s son during WWII) and interviews with many of those still living that observed the interaction between Winston and FDR bring useful insight and authenticity to the subject material. More critically though, Meacham brings his careful eye to both the events and the two principals’ histories and behavior (e.g. one of my favorite bon mots: “Governing was what Churchills and Roosevelts did”). These two men may well have “loved to hear their own voices”, and their relationship may have had its low points, but their separate insistence of being involved in all strategic decisions during the war, and their use of a strong hand in running the military would be essential elements in their ultimate success. Such a team combination of skills, attitudes and training would combine in these two men to bring out their greatness in leading their countries over the fascists of WWII.

This is a book worth reading in order to better understand the events of WWII and also to gain some insight into the minds of two men that helped shaped the course of the 20^th century.

Book Review: "Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush" (2015) by Jon Meacham

 

Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (2015)

4 Stars out of 5

Jon Meacham

836 pages

Jon Meacham’s fifth book on American history and the personalities that shape it is entitled “Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush” (2015). When one considers common public opinion on Bush 41 (as he is known within the Bush family, along with “Poppy” and “Bush the Elder”) it is that GHWB was if not an ineffective US President, then he was at the very least an un-noteworthy one. Meacham in his previously demonstrated thoughtful manner goes to great length to show that there is far more to consider about GHWB than the public and media-held opinions on our 41^st President. However, more to the point are the implications raised by Meacham’s book: can a person be civil, respectful and effective in a modern political campaign, can a person be a good leader but a poor President, and even more to the point, is there any real benefit to the endless analysis on American television by individuals not fully informed on the background of any action taken by an American President? Coming to this book as I did as a committed Democrat in terms of my political leanings, I came away with a far more informed and respectful opinion on GHWB and even on his son, Bush 43.

Meacham does an excellent job of exploring the early life and formative factors on GHWB’s development. Bush was born to Prescott Bush and Dorothy Walker in Milton MA, though they moved to Greenwich CT shortly after his birth. Both the Bush and Walker families were long time members of the wealthy elite living in America. It must be noted though that the Bush family pushed their offspring to make it on their own. To be sure, they received a privileged education, had family connections of note and an early life without want. But the children were taught from a young age to succeed and to do so without appearing to want to do so. The desire to win (a dominant feature of GHWB’s personality) is understandable but the curious injunction to do so without appearing to make the effort is a curious aspect in my opinion. GHWB would take these life lessons into school, the business world and his political life. But before he could do so, he would enlist at 18 in the US Navy shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He would actually become the youngest naval aviator in the USN at the time of earning his wings. His stint in the Navy would include 58 missions in the Pacific, one of which would result in the loss of his plane and the death of his two crewmen, an event that would haunt GHWB to the present as he wonders still if he had done everything he could do to save them.

As his stint in the Navy neared its in end in 1945 he married Barbara Pierce, surely the single-most significant anchor in GHWB’s life. They would have six children: one would be a US President, two would be state governors, and one would die from Leukemia at age 3. The death of Robin in 1953, the same year Jeb would be born and eldest child George W would be six, would like the death of his two crewmen bring GHWB to tears during his interviews with Meacham. In fact, the number of times that GHWB would display his compassion during the Meacham interviews as relayed by Meacham in his book is one of the most compelling and enlightening aspects of the book. This man characterized by the media as lacking in any empathy for the citizens of the US (most especially during the 1992 campaign for president) is shown by Meacham to be highly empathic, kind and sensitive to the needs of others.

With the close of WWII, GHWB was now free to return to his deferred college education at Yale. Prior to graduating Phi Beta Kappa with a BA in Economics, GHWB would be the captain of the baseball team, become a member of the Skull and Crossbones Society, and like his father before and his son after him, and would join the cheerleading squad. This curious membership intrigues me more than the Skull and Crossbones membership; the reason being that going to Yale is only a part of the family destiny, but in keeping with the family charter of succeeding, one has to be a team member. This passion for leading but also of fitting in with the team, the idea that for those that have, there is a deep-seated drive to give back is a key aspect to the Bush family ambitions. To be sure, the Bushes drive as hard as they can to succeed, but it is not just the drive to succeed that is so important, it is this component of their make-up that says they must do everything they can to help  American society that I think is the most noteworthy. Perhaps, their chosen means to helping that society may be misconstrued or under-appreciated by those with different chosen paths to helping America, but it is hard to complain about the Bush motivations.

GHWB would leave Yale to strike out on his own in a direction far different from his stock broker and senator father and father-in-law: the Texas oil industry. With some help from father Prescott, GHWB would move to Odessa TX as a sales clerk. Over the course of 18 years, GHWB would rise to President of his own off-shore oil drilling company, Zapata Offshore and would have become a millionaire by age 40. He did this quite frankly via his own initiative and drive. Meacham’s book does not reveal much more than advice and good will from his well-connected family and friends. The later criticisms of GHWB as having a silver spoon throughout his life do not really appear to be the case.

By 1964, GHWB would turn his attention to Texas politics and then shortly later to national politics. His father had been a two-term US Senator from CT, but it again appears GHWB’s interest and eventual success in politics are self-generated. It is quite possible that his father’s time as a US Senator inspired GHWB, but the direct role of the father according to Meacham seems to have been minimal. In any event, following a short stint as a local Republican Party chairman, and a failed run at US Senator, GHWB won a seat in the US House of Representatives in 1967; he would hold this seat for two terms frequently supporting States Rights issues (over civil liberties) and President Nixon on his Viet Nam policies. His time as a Representative would end when he made a second failed run at US Senator in 1968. GHWB’s political career appeared to be over. Fortunately for him, while a Representative he had made a powerful ally in the form of Richard Nixon. Nixon would start GHWB on a decades-long career as an appointed servant of the American people: Nixon’s appointee as Ambassador to the UN and Chairman of the National RNC, President Gerald Ford’s appointee as “Ambassador” to the People’s Republic of China and as CIA Director. With Ford’s defeat to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 Presidential race, GHWB’s career as an appointee also ended.

The 1980 presidential race would again change GHWB’s status: this time it would put him on the road to the White House. GHWB would fail in his attempt at the Republican Party’s nominating process for President. And despite his at times verbally-rough battle against Ronald Reagan, the eventual winner of both the nominating process and the general election, GHWB would be RR’s choice for Vice-president; albeit his second choice, behind Gerald Ford who had turned the offer down, but his choice nevertheless. It is GHWB’s time as the 43^rd US VP that I find the most enlightening about his character. He would transform from the fierce opponent of Reagan and his “Voodoo Economics” (as termed by GHWB) to his most loyal lieutenant. Despite having GHWB’s own reputation often being impugned as being nothing more than a lap dog to Reagan or of being a “wimp”, GHWB would constantly use his abilities and experience in the service of his boss, President Reagan. GHWB’s time as VP stand in such stark contrast to Dan Quayle under GHWB (1989-1993) or Dick Cheney’s years under GHWB’s son, Bush 43 (2001-2009). GHWB would stand in the background to Reagan never doing anything that smacked of “grandstanding” or independent, let alone contrary behavior to that established by his boss. Quayle for example would demonstrate on several occasions his propensity for self-aggrandizement at the expense of anyone, including his boss. Cheney would operate so independently as VP to Bush 43, that he would be accused by many to be functioning as the President, rather than VP. Not GHWB, he would be the trusted assistant, possibly compromising his own political policies, but never his principles in the service of his President.

Well maybe he would on one occasion he would compromise his principles and this is likely the low point of his otherwise morally upright career: the 1987 “arms for hostage” imbroglio under Reagan. This operation which sought to trade with Iran in an effort to free the hostages had been expressly forbidden by a US law prohibiting any negotiation with the hostage takers. A scheme was created under the influence of US Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, a member of Reagan’s National Security Council. As a Vice President chartered by his President to take a large role in issues of national security, GHWB was present at several meetings where this plan to free the hostages was discussed. There is considerable corroborating evidence to support the assertion that GHWB had knowledge of the negotiations; and yet he denies any knowledge when he states he was “not in the loop”. It is per Meacham an assertion that is “unworthy of his character”. This comment by Meacham gives the reader deep insight into the tone of the book and of the deep and abiding respect by Meacham for his book’s subject. Meacham has built his biography of GHWB around the central pillar of a principled man, and despite the Iran hostage affair’s apparent lapse by GHWB, Meacham will follow in GHWB’s footsteps and try to be as gentle and kind toward his subject’s lapse as he possibly can.

At the end of the Reagan era, GHWB will with the somewhat lukewarm endorsement of Reagan run for and win the job of US President in 1988. During his four years as President, he will manage American strategy during the dissolution of the USSR – this will be a period of extreme danger to the world as a whole. Fortunately for the world, American actions will depend on a man that thought deeply with a view to history and respect to others, often at the cost of his own treatment in the hands of the press and others not fully informed of events. Two events during this period amply illustrate this last point: the restive actions of Lithuania to throw off Moscow’s control and the brief period following Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s removal from power by an internal coup d’etat. In the first case, the USSR had embargoed Lithuania’s delivery of energy from the USSR. This was in response to rising anti-USSR demonstrations in Lithuania. To his immense credit and completely unknown to anyone outside of the halls of power in Washington and Moscow, GHWB negotiated with Gorbachev a hidden deal that would help both the USSR and its growing economic problems with a IMF loan, return the needed supply of fuel and electricity to Lithuania, and keep all of this hidden from view in order to save everyone’s sense of “face”. Similar cool-handed tactics during the Moscow putsch that removed Gorbachev by an reactionary conservative movement in the dying USSR allowed the soon to be departed USSR to gracefully and bloodlessly move onto a post-authoritarian regime. No one died, no one lost face, and no one outside of the insiders knew.

In my opinion, GHWB’s performance as Reagan’s VP in contrast to his own VP, Dan Quayle, and then again when GHWB handled the two cases shown above demonstrates that there is a place for tactful, thoughtful analysis and execution in the role of US President. Based on the absurd Republican campaign of 2016, there is very little reason to believe that the Party of Lincoln, of Theodore Roosevelt, or of Ronald Reagan still believes this to be true. I quite frankly wonder which if any of these men, let alone a “wimp” like GHWB would be nominated by their party in 2016, nominated that is based on their strategic vision, principles or experience. It is far more likely they would be elected or not based the antithetical behaviors of slander, inexperience, and from-the-hip thinking that so strongly characterizes modern campaigning.

Is there room in the early 21^st Century for politicians that like GHWB are graceful in tone; who know a lives based on respect for their fellow man and then live their life according to that type of morality; and who love their duty to family and their country more than their reputation or career. I hope so, but fear it may not be true in the age of 24 hour “news”, of Super PACs, and of a country that really seems to pray at the altar of “Me First”. The Age of the Dedicated Public Servant may well have had its last, best adherent in George Herbert Walker Bush. I did not, do not agree with all of his policies (most especially his domestic policies), but he is one of the very few politicians I greatly respect despite his political philosophies, and this is due to his stature as one of the few principled politicians of our times.

I always search out certain themes, topics, and authors when I choose a book to read. Jon Meacham heads the list of my favorite biographers. He did his best work with his Pulitzer Prize winning book on Andrew Jackson (“American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White house”, 2008), continued at a high level with his biography of Thomas Jefferson in 2012, and now this book on GHWB. Each of these books is definitely worth reading by anyone interested in a careful analysis of the people and the personalities that have shaped American history. “Destiny and Power…” is an excellent book that should be read by all, but most especially by left-leaning readers such as me. Just like George HW Bush found, it is always educational to read and better understand both sides of an argument before one forms an opinion.

Double Book Review: Biographies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson by Jon Meacham

 

American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House (2009)

Four and half Stars out of Five

Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power (2012)

Four Stars out of Five

Jon Meacham

Under Jon Meacham as editor-in-chief at Newsweek, that once popular but now gone news weekly achieved remarkable heights in terms of news analysis, rivaling even the current standard for such reporting, The Economist. Though Meacham is now a contributing editor at Time magazine, he also has also written four books and acted as the editor on two more, all with a focus on American history. His prose is fluid and agile, and generally provides a point of view towards his subjects that does not ignore their flaws. His greatest appeal to me as a reader is that unlike some other historians that produce books for the general public, Meacham always does a good job of analyzing the historical consequences of his subjects’ actions. Presumably Meacham chose to write books on Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson because of similarities in their impact on the modern presidency; certainly their natures and attitudes regarding most subjects beyond the importance of the presidency and the preservation of the Union could not be further apart. Because of this similarity in impact, this review will combine both books into a single review.

In Meacham’s latest book, “Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power”, Jon Meacham reveals much about Jefferson but also delineates two critical aspects of Meacham’s approach to the subject area. In a broad sense, history can be told to the general reading public in a variety of ways: for example, adversarial/muck raking, fawning hack summaries, neutral reporting, or in the case of Meacham a method that has been referred to in the NY Times as the Flawed Giant. That is to say, the subjects are persons of historical importance and while they certainly do not have feet of clay, they do have some flaws that must be investigated and explained as thoroughly as their strengths and successes. Consider for example the presidents under review in these two books:  both held slaves, Jefferson held quite hypocritical views on the topic of slavery, Jackson was equally dismissive of the rights for Native Americans, and both practiced campaign strategies that took little notice of former allegiances or respect for their adversaries’ reputations and true abilities, all in the name of getting themselves elected. Meacham covers all of this territory in the two books referenced above, and while he pays only a moderate amount of time on some of their flaws (e.g. Jefferson’s hypocrisy as regards his slave/mistress Sally Hemmings and their offspring working as his house servants), he goes into great depth in other areas of questionable behavior such as Jackson’s near self-destructive defense of his Secretary of War John Eaton and his wife, Peggy.

The second aspect of Meacham’s approach to politics is suggested in the title on Jefferson; that is to say, the “Art of Power”. Meacham’s view towards leading is that a level of pragmatism along with the more expected traits of decisiveness and strength of will is an essential aspect of running a democracy: this is shown to be the technique of Jefferson, and to stand in stark contrast with Jackson’s firmly held belief in his own vision. Even though some groups within modern America have done their best to demean "compromise" as a trait found only in weaklings, the ability to function as a politician, to find a middle way between two warring viewpoints is in fact according to Meacham’s analysis of Jefferson a key aspect to his success and impact on the office of the modern American presidency. According to Meacham, “…politics is an imperfect means to an altruistic end”; and by politics, he referring to compromise, to pragmatism. How these two presidents employed their own personal skills in politics is a central theme of both books.

In “Art of Power” (one of the 2012’s best according to the NY Times Book Review), Jon Meacham describes in modest detail the early life and influences on Thomas Jefferson, his writings (Declaration of Independence amongst others), his role in the Revolutionary War as the Virginia governor, his political life under George Washington, the endless battles with Alexander Hamilton and “neo-Monarchists” aka the Federalists, his years as president, and post-presidential years leading up to his reconciliation with John Adams and their near simultaneous deaths on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in 1826. His personal life is described by Meacham and shown how it was fraught with tragedy as his young wife and multiple offspring all met early deaths. Additionally discussed is how his intellectual life was one to be modeled by anyone: architect, scientist, agronomist, and politician. One area in the book I thought could have been enhanced would have been to better link how Jefferson’s personal experiences as son, husband, and father shaped his political thought processes. One could draw a conclusion from Meacham’s exploration of Jefferson that he came to his philosophies almost without influence from his personal life. This is the greatest weakness of the book for me.

Where the book does catches fire, was in Meacham’s summary of the 1790’s. During this era, the two party system starts to take shape and Meacham goes into great detail describing the political polarities of the time as well as the viciousness of the partisan politics (including a series egregious acts by Jefferson himself in his 1796 presidential race against Adams). The party Jefferson came to represent was an agrarian-centered/small government group of republicans, while John Adams (Jefferson’s former best friend and colleague) and Alexander Hamilton led and spoke for the Federalists, a strong central government party. To be certain, there were many leaders and members of each party beyond the three I list here. But I choose to focus (as does Meacham) on Adams due to his Revolutionary War alliances with Jefferson and on Hamilton, who for Jefferson came to represent an icon of political immorality as he (in Jefferson’s view) pushed hard for a movement back to monarchy. Much is made in the book on Jefferson’s near mania over his fears of a return to monarchy and how the average American of the time stood to lose in such a scenario. Were Jefferson’s fears exaggerated or real – this is an area on which I would have liked a two viewpoint discussion by Meacham. We get a clear idea of Jefferson’s view on the subject, but little non-partisan analysis on the Federalist viewpoint.

What we do get and enjoyably so, is several examples of Jefferson’s pragmatism. A good example was an early example of State needs versus those of the Federal government. In the early years following the Revolutionary War, about half the states were suffering from deep debts incurred during the war. Hamilton worked hard to get the Federal government to raise taxes in order to provide relief to the states. Jefferson with his small government mindset was firmly opposed to the taxes as well as to the idea that the Federal government would or should intrude on state issues (it was also opposed by his home state of Virginia, which was not in debt). Despite his strong opposition to the relief act (it had been argued against on Jefferson’s behalf by his longtime friend and political colleague, James Madison), Jefferson was able to reach a compromise with Hamilton and the Federalists. Other examples of Jefferson’s willingness to compromise his beliefs about government versus his great desire to protect and advance the American experiment are given throughout the book. The key was always in Jefferson’s analysis: do what was needed to protect and nurture the new American republic, even if that meant compromising your personal ideals.

In a contrasting manner, Meacham’s Pulitzer-prize winning book on Andrew Jackson, “American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House” goes into the life and times of our seventh president, by focusing on his approach to the presidency and his unstinting view point that his viewpoint, his vision of populism should guide the American government’s actions. And as with Jefferson, Meacham demonstrates how the nature of political campaigning have changed little in the near hundred and ninety years since Jackson's election in 1828. There were with the Jackson years a number of critical battles that took place (US Bank charter, federal tariff on imports, and the Eaton problem). The dogged manner in which Jackson pursued each of these problems were critical to how he expanded and shaped the office of the presidency; effects that linger into the 21^st century.

Jackson began his professional life as a Nashville lawyer who later evolved into a planter, politician and militia officer. He began his private life by courting a married woman (Rachel Donelson Robards); he later married her, though questions about her legal eligibility for a new marriage were very much up in the air. Her death following his successful presidential campaign in 1828 provide a good view of Andrew Jackson’s approach to life. He fiercely loved and defended her, but felt the brutal attacks on her chastity during the campaign led in Jackson’s view to her early death. How Jackson responded in terms of ferocity and his permanent defense of his loved ones and allies versus his assault on his enemies gives an interesting contrast to Jefferson and his approach to political opponents: there was no mercy or compromise in Jackson; his enemies were enemies alone, and no grey was ever seen by him.

Another example of Jackson’s lack of an approach to compromise was the problems endured by his Secretary of War, John Eaton and his problematic wife, Margaret (Peggy) Timberlake. Peggy was widely despised/disapproved of by the Washington elite due to Eaton and her living together prior to their  marriage. The problem gained serious traction when the wife John Calhoun’s (Jackson’s VP) snubbed Peggy and influenced many others to do so, too. The consequences of this seemingly trivial affair were actually critical and far reaching. Jackson in typical Jacksonian fashion divided Washington into two groups: Friends of Peggy (and thus Jackson) and Enemies. One consequence was that Calhoun would be replaced by the bachelor Martin Van Buren (he had no wife to feud with Peggy; there were philosophical issues, too). Van Buren would succeed Jackson as president in 1836. One can easily wonder at presidential succession had the Eaton affair not occurred: conceivably it would still not have been Calhoun, but Van Buren’s chances would have been considerably dimmed, too had he not had the position of VP. Other consequences were equally profound as Jackson found his policies and alliances within the Washington ruling class to some degree compromised and distracted by this otherwise petty problem. With Peggy as with the case of Jackson’s wife Rachel, the consequences of infelicities of the couples involved always landed the hardest on the female half of the pair. In these cases, Meacham also does a great job of showing just how much a blood sport in early 19^th century America politicking could become and the price innocent bystanders would sometimes suffer.

Two other major examples from the Jacksonian era were his battles over the re-chartering of the US Bank and his decision to “relocate” the Cherokee nation from Georgia to Oklahoma territory. In the first case, Meacham succinctly details the fight by Jackson over this issue, but like the fight between Jefferson and the Federalists, I would have liked more discussion on why the re-chartering might have been good for the US. Jackson derived his decision based on his distaste for the involvement of the Federal government in banking and his conclusion that the bank only met the needs of an elite and wealthy few at the expense of the many – but was there a valid opposing point of view? In the case of the Cherokees, Jackson claimed to be actually doing them a favor as the contrary case of “allowing” them to stay in Georgia on their own property would have caused a situation where their eventual outcome would have been worse than their re-location (i.e. the local white populace would have massacred them). There are so many reasons why this logic is faulty and offensive, I cannot even comment; like for example, how about sending in the cavalry to protect them. Both of these cases demonstrate that with Jackson his views of what was best for the majority would almost always trump the rights of the few. The Eaton affair was an exception to this rule but an example of Jackson’s other rule: his family and allies always came first, logic and evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

What do Meacham’s biographies of Jefferson and Jackson show these two presidents to have in common? Primarily, Meacham deftly shows how each man via his own personal style of politicking and political gamesmanship worked to expand and define the role of the president in the fledgling American government. It is an absolute certainty that George Washington was uniquely gifted in setting the stage for the role of the president, but these two later presidents demonstrated through their actions new and clear presidential responsibilities and latitude as a part of our tripartite system. A second important point was these early years were far more perilous for our young government than most contemporary Americans understand. Meacham not only does a marvelous job of defining that peril as seen by these two men and demonstrating how they helped the United States survive the early years when our survival was not a given, but also to crucially set examples of presidential prerogatives for all presidents to follow. Yes, Washington was great and unique, but Jefferson and Jackson were in many ways, even more so on both points.