Eisenhower, The White House Years (2011)
3 Stars out of 5
Jim Newton
Growing up as I did in the sixties and being the child of a
pair of ardent Democrats, I have long carried around the notion that Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 34th President of the United States was not an effective
or engaged president. Whatever flaws there may be in Jim Newton’s “Eisenhower,
the White House Years”, and if it has but a single value to the interested
reader, it is that Jim Newton will over the course of 452 pages disabuse any
reader of such opinions regarding Eisenhower as an indifferent president. That
Eisenhower made mistakes and may well have over-relied on covert action, and
was far too passive in moving forward the civil rights of Black Americans is
made clear in Newton’s book; but inactive and inattentive as president; no,
that Eisenhower was not.
Eisenhower was born in Texas, the third son of seven boys. He
and his older brother Edgar were nicknamed Ike (Big and Little, respectively).
Little Ike was raised with his brothers in Abilene Kansas (one passed away as a
child). His father David was a failed storeowner that eventually supported his
family as a mechanic. To say that David played only a small role in influencing
Ike is only really to say what a large role Ike’s mother has played in shaping
young boy’s personality. Her influence came primarily in the form of her
Mennonite upbringing and the rigid manner in which she ran her household. She
had hopes that all of her sons would be successful and share her pacifistic
leanings. She endured his decision to go to West Point, but it was certainly
not the direction in life she had hoped for him or any of her sons. That Ike
had made his choice on the basis of the economy of getting a free college
education was largely his only reason in choosing West Point; that it further
shaped his nature by bringing him into contact with the other personalities
that would create President Eisenhower cannot be doubted.
Of these other personalities, they all came from military: Generals
George S. Patton, Fox Hunter, Douglas MacArthur, and George Marshall – all but
Patton were officers that the aspiring Eisenhower reported to and learned from
after leaving West Point. Patton on the other hand was initially a friend and
colleague early in their military careers and later a difficult but talented
underling. One last influence of surpassing importance to Eisenhower was Carl
von Clausewitz, the early 19th century Prussian military theorist
that Fox Conner introduced Eisenhower to while helping Eisenhower learn the foundational
aspects of military strategy. Newton describes via a brief discussion of how
military theory at the time broke down into two camps: Napoleonic which sought
to destroy an enemy’s ability to
fight vs. Clausewitz’ strategy of eliminating his foes’ desire to fight. That Eisenhower was influenced by Clausewitz is
clearly important, but having once introduced the concept, Newton does not
really elaborate on in it during Eisenhower’s war or presidential years. This omission
by Newton is the enduring criticism I have of the book: it is often a good, but
overly succinct listing of the events surrounding Eisenhower; there is simply
too little analysis by Newton of the broader implications of Eisenhower’s
decisions.
Newton quickly moves through Eisenhower’s courting and
marriage to Mamie Dowd in 1916 and much of his early military career. The loss
of their first child to scarlet fever, a boy nicknamed Icky was devastating to both
Mamie and Dwight; the pain stayed with Eisenhower throughout his life. They had
a second child 18 months later, John. John might well be added to those who
played a significant role in Eisenhower as he eventually grew to adulthood and
became an important part of Eisenhower’s presidential advisory team. The Eisenhowers
had several other tough patches in the marriage besides the loss of Icky, but following
the birth of John, they generally were a tight and loving couple. Following
WWI, Eisenhower held positions under General John J Pershing and later under
General Douglas McArthur. His influence under the latter General was more of a
negative effect in the sense that the maturing Eisenhower was able to see how
an egotistical leader that failed to value his subordinates was doomed in the
long run to failure. As WWII dawned, Eisenhower was assigned through the
influence of Fox Conner to the general staff of General George Marshall. As the
need for a supreme US commander in Europe became more apparent, Eisenhower was
picked by FDR for that role. Newton does a good job of discussing how
Eisenhower was positively influenced by Marshall and his own WWII experience as
a commander; the key lesson being the importance of creating a good staff that
a leader such as Marshall or Eisenhower could fully rely on.
The bulk of the book by Newton is as the title suggests on Eisenhower’s
presidential years: 1953-1961. These years are so often looked back on by
Americans as a period of stability, and if one is feeling critical towards the
Eisenhower Administration, years of inactivity. The strength of Newton’s book
is that he is able to demonstrate very clearly that in actual fact, the US
faced extremely serious, potentially catastrophic problems abroad in the form
of a series of aggressive patterns of behavior by the communists in charge of
People’s Republic of China and the USSR, and in the form of anti-communist demagoguery
in the US led by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Additionally, Eisenhower found
himself constantly being pushed by his generals and various conservatives in
the US government to be far more aggressive in responding to the communists
abroad and to the growing clamor for legal recognition of the rights of Black
Americans – an issue that Eisenhower had very mixed feelings about.
Eisenhower’s approach to the problems presented to the
American people and their government by the Russians and communist Chinese was
a strategy that he tried to use in almost all his problem solving: the Middle
Way. This was essentially a path between the competing forces from the right that
strove to push Eisenhower to use nuclear weapons in a tactical manner vs. those
from the left that may well have chosen acquiescence to the various Russian and
Chinese advances (this point of view is rarely given much attention in the
book). For the most part Eisenhower found himself arguing for more subtle and
covert approaches to preventing the spread of communism; this may have been successful
in some cases for the short run, but sowed the seeds for future problems. Two
good cases about future problems would have been the CIA’s coordination of
events leading the ouster of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh and the
coup d’etat of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. Both of these forays by the
CIA had the effect of convincing the Eisenhower Administration of their ability
(or so they believed) of being able to successfully change administrations in
countries they had concerns over, but also led to the maturation of future
opponents: Ayatollah Khomeini and Che Guevara. I think a good argument could be
made that during the 1950’s, the CIA was almost out of control. At the very
least they overvalued their effectiveness, and by their own records lied about
their mistakes to Eisenhower.
However, Eisenhower’s refusal to employ nuclear weapons to
end the Korean War, to discourage the Chinese from bombarding Quemoy and Matsu
(two small islands contested by communists and their nationalists cousins on
Taiwan), to force Russian Premier Nikita Khruschev from isolating West Berlin,
or any number of other cases where Eisenhower’s generals urged him to consider
if not actually use nuclear weapons to force his opposition into retreat, quite
probably kept the world from entering Armageddon. The positive consequences of Ike’s
middle way was that throughout this period only one American serviceman lost
his life in combat, while the communists failed to substantially progress
anywhere. This comparison is especially noteworthy when contrasted to Eisenhower’s
successor John F Kennedy’s much more forceful approach. (Kennedy’s strategy was
referred to by JFK as a “flexible approach”. It was an issue upon which he
campaigned with great vigor when he ran against Richard Nixon and the Eisenhower
legacy in 1960). That JFK’s approach led to the immediately disastrous Bay of
Pigs fiasco in Cuba and the long running tragedy that was Viet Nam suggests
strongly to Newton the correctness of Eisenhower’s foreign policy and defense
strategies. Whether or not there were long term downsides to Ike’ Middle Way or
not is not discussed in “Eisenhower”, and again is one of the flaws with Newton’s
book. Like so many biographies, “Eisenhower” generally views the big picture of
events surrounding Eisenhower with a very favorable point of view. To Newton’s
credit he often looks critically at some of the “smaller” events during the Eisenhower
years.
Of the “smaller” events examined by Newton two stand out:
McCarthyism and Black Civil Rights. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was a fellow
Republican; a bully that used innuendo and unfounded implications of guilt to
ruin anyone in his sights; anyone he could step on as he sought personal political
power. Per Newton, Eisenhower’s most disgraceful episode during McCarthy’s
reign of terror was when Eisenhower publically failed to support his primary
mentor (and friend), General George Marshall when McCarthy sought to ruin
Marshall. However, also according to Newton, Eisenhower employed a variation of
his Middle Way in dealing with several Republican Party problems, and McCarthy
was just one more. Eisenhower felt that ignoring McCarthy would starve McCarthy
of the attention he so desperately needed. Eventually though, Eisenhower
finally had enough of McCarthy and decided on active engagement of “Tail-gunner
Joe”. Following two decisions by the Supreme Court (largely the result of Eisenhower
appointee, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s influence), McCarthy’s power started to
wane and was finally eliminated as a result of the Eisenhower’s back room pressure
on other Republican senators to censure McCarthy. That McCarthy’s loss of
influence may have come more as the direct result of Earl Warren and the other Eisenhower
appointees to the Supreme Court was an interesting outcome of Eisenhower’s
leadership philosophy of relying on this subordinates; in this case, his
tremendous reliance on his attorney general, Herbert Brownell.
Whether Brownell stacked the court with liberal democrats
and republicans (there were five Eisenhower appointees in all) under his own initiative
or at the hidden behest of Eisenhower is not clear to history. One thing that is
clear to history is that the influence of Warren was profound. Besides the
decisions that started McCarthy’s downfall, there were multiple decisions regarding
other civil rights, most notably Brown v. Board of Education. This decision and
subsequent ones that essentially ruled segregation was inherently unconstitutional
(thus overturning the 1896 Supreme Court decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, which
permitted segregation based on the “equal but separate” concept and gave the
Southern States free rein to practice segregation). In was in this backward way
of approach just as with McCarthy that Eisenhower addressed such fratricidal party
and civil rights issues. The most direct manner in which Eisenhower involved
the government in the issues surrounding segregation was when Eisenhower and
the Federal government were faced with opposition in 1957 by the governor of
Arkansas with regards the desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. While
Eisenhower often morally equated segregationists with those seeking equal
protection under the law by fighting segregation, he would not abide active
refusal by state governments in their attempts to “nullify” federal law. Quite
likely this attitude hearkened to his military history as much as to any other
any influence: when your commanding officer gives you a direct order, you obey.
Eisenhower’s role in history is a good example of the old
argument about great leaders: are great leaders born or created by the times
they find themselves in; and just as in most cases, nearly impossible to answer.
Eisenhower had a very strong will and personality. He had been formed via the
influence of several positive role models and mentors during his life. He had
firmly held opinions that shaped his morality. And for the most part he acted
in accordance with these influences. Unquestionably he failed as he certainly
moved too slowly to defend the civil liberties of people with whom he disagreed
(American communists and those accused of such party affiliations) and just as
avidly wanted to not push the Southern States with regards to Black American
constitutional rights. But his weaknesses were more than balanced by his strengths.
He had a soldier’s ungrudging respect for the sacrifices made in war time, by
civilian and military alike. And this point of view must surely have shaped his
foreign policy views as he sought to hold off his generals and their far too
quick desire to use the nuclear weapons at their disposal; no matter the
ultimate risk to the world. In the final analysis, America was very lucky to
have as her leader a man such as Eisenhower in the era following the invention of
the atom and hydrogen bombs; weapons that for the first time were
simultaneously essential for the defense of the country and were capable of
destroying that same country as even as they were used to defend her. Only a powerful
and insightful leader such as Eisenhower would have the will and political suasion
to compel his country’s military to his view, while at the same time the
intelligence and far seeing vision to deal with ruffians like McCarthy and
Khrushev. It is a pity he did not bring this same intelligence and wisdom to
civil rights, but America, indeed the world was very fortunate he was the man
with his finger on the nuclear trigger during the “calm, peaceful and
uneventful” 1950’s. So, yes, I think he was a great Man not formed by the events,
but one well cast to respond to those events.
Were the 1950’s quiet and uneventful; was Eisenhower remote
and disengaged? Clearly, after reading this book, it is inevitable the reader
will answer “no” to both questions. However, is this biography a great one;
sadly, I must confess to the same answer, “no”. This biographer has the all too
common problem of over praising and under criticizing his subject on the big
issues; though not too excessively. The primary problem with this book is that
there is too little critical analysis, too little examination of the
consequences of Eisenhower’s long range decisions. The one time Newton does it,
near the end of the book’s end, the book shines. As Newton closes his recitation
of the Eisenhower years, he discusses the events in early 21st
century America, the second Iraq war and how they relate to one of Eisenhower’s
most famous quotes. It comes during the middle of his farewell address to
America in 1960. His quote like the man is not as simple as it is usually
referenced. Eisenhower did not simply warn America of the Military-Industrial
complex. He commented on its essentialness, and then warned America about it.
But the key here is to whom did he direct the responsibility to control and
watch for this complex: the various branches of the government, the press; no, rather
it was aimed at the people. At heart, Eisenhower remained the true conservative
that he was; the action required to control the beast that might get out of control,
were the people not their institutions.
This book is worth reading to better understand a president
that many historians have placed in America’s top ten. Reading it will enlighten,
but almost surely depress anyone considering the crop of non-leaders running
for the US presidency in 2015. What America needs now, it needed in 1953, a
leader. Fortunately, America had one to turn to in 1953; this is quite clearly
not the case in 2015.
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