Franklin and Winston: A Portrait of a Friendship (2003)
4 Stars out of 5
Jon Meacham
490 pages
Having recently read Doris Kearns Goodwin’s fine book on
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt (“No Ordinary Time: Franklin and EleanorRoosevelt, The Home Front in WWII”, 1995) I was captivated with her description
of the closeness in the relationship between the US President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. It was thus with
some enthusiasm that I sought out and read Jon Meacham’s book on that very
subject, “Franklin and Winston: “A Portrait of a Friendship” (2003). This was
Meacham’s first book as an author, though his second actual published book (the
first was as an editor). It is a remarkably clear and concise book written with
apparent conviction in the character of the two men being profiled. Two men
that most definitely stand up to Meacham’s comment: “…it does matter who is in
power at critical points.”
FDR’s first meeting with Winston did not bode at all well
for their future relationship: Winston had no memory of it, while FDR did not
like what he saw in Winston’s brusque manner. It was at a party held in London,
1918. At the time, Winston was the former 1st Lord of the Admiralty,
while FDR was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Even though they didn’t know
it at the time, they had much in common: not just positions within each country’s
navy, but as one might guess considering their occupations, great fascination
in naval strategy and how it could be used in the defense of their countries;
coupled with this was a similar thirst in both men for political power. They
were also close to the same age (Winston was 43, FDR was 36), loved strong
drink, tobacco, and both were filled to the brim with self-confidence and courage
– twenty years later they would have ample opportunity to display these
characteristics.
They renewed their stalled relationship in the autumn of
1939 when FDR wrote Winston to congratulate him on his re-appointment to the
Admiralty. Winston had re-joined the Navy under Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain. This PM with his doomed strategy of trying to negotiate a lasting
peace with Adolph Hitler did not care for Winston Churchill. The problem Chamberlain had with Churchill
was Churchill’s public enthusiasm for using the military to solve international
disputes. Nevertheless, Chamberlain was clear-headed enough to see by September
of that year that the English people needed a warrior, not a negotiator. Winston
would shortly thereafter become PM and replace Chamberlain in May 1940. Early in this period as PM, as the situation
in Europe deteriorated further with the Nazis taking one country after another,
Winston would devise a simple maxim: the only sure path to victory required
getting the Americans into the war. He decided the needed tactic was to “woo” the
American people with him and England as the suitor, and the Americans and FDR
as the reluctant maiden.
Winston’s decision and actions taken in the “wooing” of FDR
seemed in the context of Meacham’s book to often set Winston into a position of
inferiority in the relationship between the two men. In some circumstances
their relationship was as between two close families: they would spend 131 days
together between 1939 and FDR’s death in the spring of 1945; but like families
everywhere, they would have some very bad times as well. Their meetings
together in the US would be amongst their closest as they spent various
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays celebrating simply (almost simply) as two
close friends. I note it was “almost simply” as these gatherings were never
just about the holidays: they were always meeting to formulate the needed plans
to defeat Hitler.
Winston brought to these discussions a personal major lesson
from history: the English defeat at Gallipoli in WWI. He had had a big role in
the planning of that disastrous affair for the British and to a great degree it
played in the back of his mind each time FDR, (Soviet Premier) Stalin and
Winston discussed the long delayed invasion of France by the Allies. Stalin was
fighting a brutal war with Hitler and pressed constantly for his two capitalist
comrades to invade France in order to force Hitler to transfer some of his
eastern troops to the western front and thus reduce the pressure on the Red
Army. Winston fearing a repeat of the debacle at Gallipoli never seemed
convinced that the Allies were truly ready to storm the beaches of France; he pushed
first for a North African and then an Italian campaign. Despite the sympathetic
manner in which Meacham presents these discussions, it frankly seems as if
Winston was stalling; it certainly seemed so to Stalin. FDR in the meanwhile
backed Winston on each of the two campaigns that came before Normandy, but his
position in backing Winston never seemed fully whole hearted to Winston. Meacham
on the other hand notes that it almost certainly was the right decision to
delay the invasion to help up Allied forces in terms of materiel and troop experience.
That being said, it still seemed as if the special two-way relationship between
FDR and Winston was breaking down to some extent. It most definitely never
became a solid three-way relationship with Stalin as an equal emotional partner.
The special nature of the two-way bond changed in order to let Stalin into the
relationship, and this fundamental change was overtly bothersome to Winston; meanwhile,
FDR seemed oblivious to these effects.
This situation started to seriously deteriorate during the
conference in Tehran in 1943 and then worsen still more in Yalta in late early
1945. The Tehran conference is especially instructive. During this meeting, FDR
decided he wanted a one on one with Stalin. His reasons are far from clear, but
Meacham notes that like Winston he may have felt he could gain control of any
situation if he could only form a relationship with the person with whom he was
negotiating; and it would appear that Winston’s strong personality and similar
desire to control the conversation was disruptive to FDR’s technique. In any
event, FDR’s attempts to speak to Stalin alone while not completely hidden from
Winston were still done without Winston’s full consent. It left Winston deeply
hurt. This situation was badly exacerbated during at least one dinner
conversation where FDR was bantering with Stalin and doing so at Winston’s
expense. It worked (for FDR) to the extent that Stalin ultimately would erupt
in laughter, but failed to some degree as Winston would leave the table deeply
chagrined; likely feeling betrayed. The irony of this whole episode is that the
take-away from these exchanges between the three was that both Winston and FDR
felt they understood and could control Stalin – Eastern European history has
shown that nothing could have been further from the truth.
Late in 1943, their relationship would recover from the emotional
depths of Tehran as both the Churchill and Roosevelt clans would meet again
without Stalin, this time in Quebec during the holidays. During these
festivities new highs and lows would occur. Their relationship would regain its
feet and both would feel that this period was one of the happiest of their
lives. The lows (for Winston at least) would occur when he tried once again to
delay the pending May invasion at Normandy (it was ultimately deferred to 5Jun,
and then again to 6Jun due to weather). Winston would fail in his quixotic
quest, and would again in July when he would try to divert some of the forces
in France to another fight the British were waging in the Mediterranean.
Winston was endlessly convinced of the wrongness in FDR’s comment that the “shortest
route to Berlin was a straight line” (from Normandy); it seems almost like a
monomania. He just never truly gave up on the idea of not going through France.
Poor Winston was to have one more rough meeting with Stalin
and FDR; this one in Yalta in early 1945. The meeting could not have had more
importance: the shape of the new world order following WWII. In Yalta as in
Tehran, FDR would seek out private meetings with Stalin. The difference this
time is that there may have been more to his reasons than a tactical sense he
could out-maneuver Stalin better singly than with Winston present. This time
there was publically stated evidence from multiple occasions of FDR’s growing
impatience with Winston’s verbosity. FDR would in the presence of his own staff
(and at least one occasion with a lieutenant from Winston’s staff) make cutting
remarks about Winston’s long speeches and his continued opposition to the Normandy
invasion plan. While these comments were generally about how wordy Winston
could get, there was also evidence of a divide between the two men that was
defined by how each viewed Stalin. It is certain that both saw the threat
(Winston perhaps more clearly than FDR), but being the type of man that each of
them were, they possibly also felt they each saw it the more clearly. However, Meacham
adds a second idea: that due to his rapidly failing health, FDR was no longer physically
the man that he once was; and with this thought, came an increasing personal sense
that he had to win every argument to prove that he was still on top of his
game. Whatever the reason, the once robust friendship between the two men was
suffering as the war drew to a close.
In the two examples of the Tehran and Yalta conferences,
Meacham amply demonstrates his strength as a writer of historical narratives. Via
his research coupled with his astute analysis of FDR and Winston’s decisions
and their consequences, the reader gets a very clear idea of not just what took
place but also gets a fairly good sense of the thoughts and passions that ran
through the primary actors in these stories. For example, Meacham’s
descriptions of the emotional Winston (“perfectly content to cry in public”)
and the publically cold FDR (Truman: “the coldest man I ever met”) leads the
reader to wonder at how with these personality differences they could become allies,
let alone such close friends. Meacham notes that Winston as the son of an
Englishman and an American woman may have brought something unique to the
situation in terms of personal history; that he clearly had an emotional tie to
the American people that was tighter than most English politicians; and being
the strategist that he was, he could see the distinct advantage in cultivating
a close relationship to FDR as the leader of the American people. But for me,
it still begs the question, was there something else that brought these two men
so close? Had WWII not intervened, would they have become friends at all? It is
to me a little frustrating that Meacham does not really ask this question, or
the follow-up question: do great men arise in time of need, or do the events
shape men into great men?
The origin of Great Men/Great Leaders is a subject really
worth discussing further and one I think about a lot. Examples of such men can readily
be found by reading about certain American presidents (Washington, Lincoln,
Wilson, and FDR in particular). While it
is certainly true that learning about such Great Men of American history in the
context of their individual times of war may leave one awed at what each of
these men did in terms of preparing our country for war and in prosecuting the
war, it always for me leads to the real question: where do such men come from? And
in the case of Winston and FDR, did their close (and productive) friendship
also arise as a result from the same forces (i.e. the demands of WWII)? These
may well be a kind of question that does not have a solid, generally true
answer. In the case of FDR and Winston Churchill though, there can be no
question of their individual greatness, the value of their partnership during
WWII, and the world’s considerable benefit derived from that relationship.
“Franklin and Winston: A Portrait of a Friendship” is an
excellent companion piece to the aforementioned Goodwin book on the Roosevelts
during WWII. While she does an excellent job of digging deep into how people’s
personalities can play critical roles in world events, Meacham’s book and style
brings needed content and analysis. Meacham’s utilization of heretofore
un-accessed letters from Pamela Churchill Randolph (married to Winston’s son
during WWII) and interviews with many of those still living that observed the
interaction between Winston and FDR bring useful insight and authenticity to
the subject material. More critically though, Meacham brings his careful eye to
both the events and the two principals’ histories and behavior (e.g. one of my
favorite bon mots: “Governing was what Churchills and Roosevelts did”). These
two men may well have “loved to hear their own voices”, and their relationship
may have had its low points, but their separate insistence of being involved in
all strategic decisions during the war, and their use of a strong hand in
running the military would be essential elements in their ultimate success. Such
a team combination of skills, attitudes and training would combine in these two
men to bring out their greatness in leading their countries over the fascists
of WWII.
This is a book worth reading in order to better understand
the events of WWII and also to gain some insight into the minds of two men that
helped shaped the course of the 20th century.
No comments:
Post a Comment